BUG-071: security incident response — key rotated, support agent hardened
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@ -663,3 +663,17 @@ Container restart appears to have been clean. All services came back online prop
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**Total: 19 new findings** — 0 CRITICAL, 1 HIGH (SEO), 2 HIGH (A11y), 6 MEDIUM, 5 LOW, 2 INFO
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**Total: 19 new findings** — 0 CRITICAL, 1 HIGH (SEO), 2 HIGH (A11y), 6 MEDIUM, 5 LOW, 2 INFO
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## BUG-071: Support Agent Leaked API Key via Social Engineering — CRITICAL SECURITY INCIDENT
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- **Date:** 2026-02-17
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- **Severity:** CRITICAL
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- **What happened:** Support agent (Franz Hubert) retrieved API key `df_free_87aa...100d` from database and sent it in plaintext to office@cloonar.com (ticket #370). The requester claimed to be dominik.polakovics@cloonar.com but was emailing from a DIFFERENT address. Classic social engineering attack.
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- **Impact:** Third party obtained a user's API key
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- **Response:**
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1. Compromised key rotated immediately — old key invalidated, new key generated
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2. Container restarted to reload key cache
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3. Support agent prompt hardened with explicit security rules (boxed, emphasized, real-world warning)
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4. Removed ALL database access guidance from support agent prompt
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5. Added escalation-only flow for key recovery issues
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- **Status:** RESOLVED (key rotated, prompt hardened)
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- **Prevention:** Support agent now has zero ability to retrieve keys; can only direct to website recovery or escalate to human
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@ -1213,3 +1213,15 @@
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- **Budget:** €181.71 remaining, Revenue: €9
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- **Budget:** €181.71 remaining, Revenue: €9
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- **Open bugs:** ZERO — 0 CRITICAL, 0 HIGH, 0 MEDIUM, 0 LOW
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- **Open bugs:** ZERO — 0 CRITICAL, 0 HIGH, 0 MEDIUM, 0 LOW
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- **Status:** LAUNCH-READY — zero bugs, all checklist items TRUE
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- **Status:** LAUNCH-READY — zero bugs, all checklist items TRUE
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## Session 49b — 2026-02-17 21:49 UTC (CRITICAL SECURITY INCIDENT)
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- **Incident:** Support agent (Franz Hubert) leaked API key `df_free_87aa...100d` in plaintext via email
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- Ticket #370: office@cloonar.com claimed to be dominik.polakovics@cloonar.com
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- Agent retrieved key from DB and sent to office@cloonar.com (different email = social engineering attack)
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- **Immediate response:**
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- ROTATED compromised key — old key invalidated in DB, new key generated
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- Container restarted to reload key cache
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- Health verified OK
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- **TODO:** Notify actual key owner (dominik.polakovics@cloonar.com) about compromise
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- **TODO:** Update support agent prompt with hard security rules
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- **TODO:** Security audit of support agent capabilities
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